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ANwAR AL-AULAQI: TARGETED KILLINGS, EMERGENCY EXECUTIVE POWERS, 
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 2002 and 2009, the United States is believed to have conducted over 50 predator 
drone strikes between Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. 1 Since January 2009, that number has 
increased to a total of over 300 strikes.2 The drone strikes reached their peak in 2010, with 121 
confirmed strikes, 117 of which took place in Pakistan. 3 The escalation in the number of drone 
strikes throughout the Middle East has been part of a concerted effort, beginning with the Bush 
Administration and intensified under the Obama Administration, to target members of al-Qaeda, 
al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and other terrorist groups included in the broader 
war against terrorism. However, with the increase in attacks emanating from Yemen, the Obama 
administration has begun shifting its focus to the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, the strikes in 
Yemen have so far outnumbered those in Pakistan for the first time in 2012.4 
Although President Obama inherited the drone program, because of the increasing 
frequency of strikes, his administration has become synonymous with the practice. Beginning in 
2010, the Administration took steps to create a targeted kill list, a process described as a 
"disposition matrix". 5 The "disposition matrix" begins with the compiling of the names of 
operatives as well as the building of rosters of terrorist organizations and their affiliates. 6 This 
task is left to certain government agencies, among them the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
1 Striking AI Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.comiinteractive/2012/05/29/worldlmiddleeast!striking-al-qaeda.html?ref'oworld; Tracking 
America's drone war, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2012), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/foreignldrones/#. 
2 Striking AI Qaeda, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2012), available at 
"''http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/29/worldlmiddleeast!striking-al-qaeda.html?reFworld. 
'!d. 
4 Greg Miller, Plan for hunting terrorists signals US. Intends to keep adding names to kills lists, WASH. POST (Oct. 
23, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldlnational-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-
us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/20 1211 0/23/4789b2ae-I 8b3-11 e2-a5 5c-39408fbe6a4b _ story.html. 
5 Id. 
6 Id 
The Department of Defense (DOD), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC).7 Once compiled, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
makes a list based on specific White House criteria and forwards the list to Deputies committee 
of the National Security Council. 8 The committee then culls the list to individuals who will be 
targeted.9 As the fmal step in the process, President Obama signs off on individuals who will be 
placed on the targeted capture/killlist.10 
In 2010, the Obama administration took the unprecedented step of placing Anwar al-
Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen, on the targeted killlist. 11 Mr. al-Aulaqi was born in New Mexico in 1971, 
and served as an imam in California and Virginia.12 Following his release from a Yemeni prison 
in 2007, Mr. al-Aulaqi became perhaps the most influential English-speaking advocate of violent 
jihad against the United States. While Mr. al-Aulaqi had never been accused of carrying out 
terrorist attacks personally, American authorities believe that he was the main inspiration for 
Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist accused of shooting thirteen people at Fort 
Hood, Texas, in November 2009, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who failed to blow up an 
airplane with a bomb hidden in his underwear in December 2009.13 In addition, Paisa! Shahzad, 
the man who attempted to set off a car bomb in Times Square in May 2010, cited al-Aulaqi as an 
inspiration. 14 Counterterrorism officials have claimed that these examples show that Mr. a!-
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
1o Id. 
n Joe Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test oJObama's Principles, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/worldlobamas-leadersbip-in-war-on-al-
qaeda.html?pagewanted~all. 
12 Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet, Imam's Path From Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad (May 8, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/world/09awlaki.html?ref=anwaralawlaki. 
13 Id.; See also Dana Priest, U.S. military teams, intelligence deeply involved in aiding Yemen on strikes, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontent/article/20 I 0/01/26/ AR20 I 0012604239 _pf.html. 
14 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note II. 
Aulaqi had evolved from being merely a propagandist into playing an operational role m 
AQAP's efforts to carry out terrorist attacks.15 
In response to media reports that Mr. al-Aulaqi had been placed on a kill list Nasser a!-
Aulaqi, Mr. al-Aulaqi's father, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.16 The suit claimed that Mr. al-Aulaqi's placement on a kill list violated his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, Fifth Amendment right not to be 
deprived of life without due process, in addition to stating a claim under the Alien Tort Statute 
for a violation of international law. 17 On December 7, 2010, the complaint was dismissed on 
standing grounds. 18 However, the District Court judge further stated that the case potentially 
presented a non-justiciable political question.19 
Mr. al-Aulaqi and his associate Samir Khan, also a U.S. Citizen, were killed by a predator 
drone strike on September 30, 2011.20 Less than a month later, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, Mr. a!-
Aulaqi's son and a U.S. citizen born in Colorado, was killed by a separate predator drone 
strike?' While the Obama Administration claims that Mr. al-Aulaqi had taken on an operational 
role in AQAP, there has been no evidence provided to show that Mr. Khan had taken on a similar 
role within the organization. According to information in the public domain, the extent of Mr. 
15 Becker & Shane, supra note 10. 
16 Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp.2d I (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 
1:10-cv-01469). 
17 Id.at9-10. 
18 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d I, 14-35 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
19 See id. at 44-52. 
20 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 
2011 }, available at http://www .nytimes.com/20 11110/0 1/world/midd1eeastlanwar-al-aw1ak:i-is-killed-in-
yemen.html?ref=middleeast. 
21 Charlie Savage, Relatives Sue Officials Over U.S. Citizens Killed by Drone Strikes in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 
20 12), available at http://www .nytirnes.com/20 12/07 /19/world/middleeastlus-officials-sued-over-citizens-killed-in-
yemen.htm1; See also Peter Finn & Greg Miller, Anwar ai-Awlaki 's family speaks out against his son's death in 
airstrike, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2011 ), available at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wor1d/national-security/anwar-
al-awlak:is-family-speaks-out-against-his-sons-deaths/20 11/10/17 /glQA8kFssL _story.html. 
Khan's involvement was limited to his being editor of Inspire, AQAP's English-language 
magazine. 22 
Even more troubling is the killing of Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi. The al-Aulaqi family has 
claimed that Abdulrahman had left the family home in Sana'a, Yemen, in order to look for his 
father, when he was killed.23 News reports, based on government sources, had originally claimed 
that the younger al-Aulaqi was in his early twenties and an AQAP militant. 24 In response to these 
reports the al-Aulaqi family released Abdulrahman's official birth certificate from the State of 
Colorado showing that he was sixteen years of age.Z5 Because the executive program is shrouded 
in secrecy there is no way to tell whether Abdulrahrnan al-Aulaqi was targeted or whether he was 
"collateral damage." 
On July 18, 2012, Mr. al-Aulaki's father again filed suit, this time on behalf of his son 
and grandson, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.26 While the new complaint 
replaced the ATS claim with a violation of the Bill of Attainder clause, the main thrust of the 
plaintiffs argument remained: The placing of an American Citizen on a targeted kill list and his 
subsequent killing violates the Constitution.27 
The current regime is one in which the Executive Branch, and the President specifically, 
is determining which individuals are being placed on the kill list and targeted without any 
oversight from the co-equal branches or the possibility of judicial review prior to a strike 
directed at an American citizen. The constitutional implications of such a state of affairs is 
22 Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, supra note 19. 
23 Peter Finn & Greg Miller, Anwar al-Awlaki's family speaks out against his son's death in airstrike, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 27, 2011) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/natiooal-security/anwar-al-awlakis-family-
speaks-out-against-his-sons-deaths/20 11/10/17 /giQA8kFssL _story.httnl. 
24 Glenn Greenwald, The killing of Awlaki's 16-year-old-son, SALON.COM (Oct. 20, 2011) available at 
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/20/the _killing_ of_ awlakis _16 _year_ old _son!. 
25 Abdulrahman al-Awlaki's birth certificate, WASH. POST (last visited Dec. 7, 2012) available at 
http://www. washiogtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/abdulrahman-al-awlaki-birth-certificate.html. 
26 Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
27 ld. at I. 
troubling: whether the Executive has the authority to operate such a program free from judicial 
oversight and, if not, whether the "disposition matrix" can withstand Constitutional review. As 
stated in a New York Times editorial piece following the disclosure of the kill list: "It is too easy 
to say that this is a natural power of a commander in chief. The United States cannot be in a 
perpetual war on terror that allows lethal force against anyone, anywhere, for any perceived 
threat. "28 
Part I of this article will briefly describe the legal status of targeted killings. The practice 
of targeted killings is a relatively recent development in both domestic and international law. Its 
legality is hotly contested both as a matter of American constitutional law and international 
humanitarian law. Although the Obama administration has attempted to justizy the practice under 
both legal frameworks, its legality remains unclear?9 
Part II of this article will review the history of presidential powers during an emergency 
and will address the issue of the extension of the authority to target and kill American citizens to 
the Executive branch and whether it can be justified under an emergency powers doctrine. 
Because Israel and the United Kingdom have an extensive history of cases dealing with terrorism 
and numerous legislative acts concerning emergency powers, they will be the contrast to 
American jurisprudence concerning emergency powers in the struggle against terrorism. 
Part III will address whether the principle of proportionality may be better suited to assist 
in judicial review with regard to the targeted killing of American citizens who take up arms with 
a non-state actor against the U.S. Because the citizen's right not to be deprived oflife absent due 
process represents a significant and fundamental right it is unclear whether the District Court will 
28 Editorial, Too Much Power for a President, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), available at 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/05/31/opinion/too-much-power-for-a-president.html. 
29 Micah Zenko, How the Obama Administration Justifies Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 
5, 2012), available at https://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/05/bow-the-obama-Administration-justifies-targeted-
killings/. 
once again be able to dismiss the suit on standing. While the Supreme Court has commonly 
deferred to the foreign policy decisions of the Executive there are significant and troubling 
constitutional implications involved in the targeting and killing of American citizens absent due 
process. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that, because of the limits on Executive power in the 
war on terror, and because the right at issue is a fundamental right, the United States Supreme 
Court will most likely be unable to uphold the Executive's authority to unilaterally place a U.S. 
citizen on a targeted kill list under a due process balancing or strict scrutiny test and would be 
better served by applying the principle of proportionality to terrorism cases going forward. 
I. The Legal Status of Targeted Killing 
In defending the predator drone program members of the Obama administration have 
consistently referred to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).30 Taken at face 
value, the AUMF would appear to support the conclusion that the drone program is, as an 
exercise of Executive authority, legal. 31 When the President acts with either explicit or implied 
authority from Congress, his power is at its maximum.32 
30 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res.23, 107th Cong. (I" Sess. 2001); See Harold Koh, Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The 
Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010); Jeh Johnson, General Counsel, U.S. Dept. ofDef., 
Speech at Yale Law School: National security law, lawyers and lawyering in the Obama Administration (February 
22, 2012); John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrurism, Remarks at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism 
Strategy (April30, 2012). 
31 See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635-637 ("When the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that 
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate ... A seizure executed by the President pursuant to 
an act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."). 
32 See id. 
The Obama administration has steadily defended their practice of targeted killing under a 
liberal definition of "imminent" as understood in intemationallaw.33 Traditionally, the concept 
of imminent has been defined as "instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment of deliberation." 34 However, the administration has argued that the geographic 
distinction limiting strikes to "hot" battlefields is inapposite when dealing with the terrorist 
threat. 35 Despite these protestations, the idea that the use of lethal force is not limited to "hot" 
battlefields is far from universally accepted. 36 
The international law concept of anticipatory self-defense also requires that the response 
to an imminent threat be both necessary and proportionate. Congress ought to have been 
presumed to know this when they inserted the "necessary and appropriate" language into the 
AUMF. Given the traditional understanding of imminent, there is nothing to suggest that those 
targeted far from a hot battlefield constitute such a threat or that a drone strike is necessary and 
appropriate. Furthermore, the language of the AUMF does not seem to cover military action in 
Yemen or against individuals who are a part of AQAP.37 
Assuming arguendo that the exigencies of the situation reqnire lethal action, there are still 
domestic law implications. In the limited public comments made by individuals the 
33 Koh, supra note 24 ("Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will 
depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat..."); See 
also John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard 
Law School (September 16, 2011) ("Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners 
have begun to recognize that the traditional concept of what constitutes an "imminent" attack should be broadened 
in light of the modem day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations ofterrorist o~anizations."). 
34 MARK W. JANIS & JOliN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 545 (3 ed. 2006). 
35 Brennan, supra note 27 ("The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa' ida as 
being restricted solely to 'hot' battlefields."); Johnson supra note 24 ("Third: there is nothing in the wording of the 
2001 AUMF or its legislative history that restricts this statutory authority to the "hot" battlefields of Afghanistan."). 
36 See Brennan, supra note 28 ("Others in the international connnunity - including some of our closest allies and 
~artners- take a different view of the geographic scope of the conflict, limiting it only to the hot battlefields."). 
7 The language of the AUMF allows the president to use necessary and appropriate force against, "those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, connnitted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons". Not only was Yemen not involved in the 
September 11"' attacks, but AQAP as an organization was not conceived until January, 2009. 
7 
Administration has superficially addressed what they argue is the process due an American 
Citizen who might be targeted. Without admitting the existence of a program, Attorney General 
Eric Holder has laid out the legal justification for targeting a citizen: 
Let me be clear: an operation using lethal force in a foreign 
country, targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational 
leader of al Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively 
engaged in planning to kill Americans, would be lawful at least in 
the following circumstances: First, the U.S. government has 
determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual 
poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United 
States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation 
would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of 
· . I 38 war pnnc1p es. 
He further concluded that the Constitution does not require the President to wait to strike until a 
theoretical end-stage of planning, and that such a delay could put American lives at jeopardy.39 
Because of the nature of terrorism, such arguments have gained considerable traction within the 
international community. However, the Attorney General would go on to conclude that the 
Constitution guarantees "due process, not judicial process."40 
In a secret legal memorandum written by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal 
Counsel government lawyers provided the justification for acting despite an Executive order 
banning assassinations, a federal law against murder, various aspects of the international laws of 
war, and the protections in the Bill of Rights, specifically the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.41 
The memo was narrowly drawn to the specifics of Mr. Au1aqi's case and concluded that what is 
considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and what process was due under the Fifth 
38 Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Northwestern University School of Law (March 5, 2012). 
39 !d. 
40 Id. 
41 Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011), available at 
'http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 11/1 0/09/worldlmiddleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-
(;itizen.html?pagewanted~1&reF=world 
Amendment was different for al-Aulaqi than an ordinary criminal. 42 As support for this 
contention, the memo cited Supreme Court cases allowing for the detention and prosecution of 
American citizens who have joined an enemy's forces.43 In addition, the memo argues that it 
would be constitutional to take lethal action in order to curtail an innninent threat to innocent 
people and that the threat could be imminent even where the enemy leader is not in the midst of 
launching an attack. 44 
Because the only evidence of the Administration's legal reasoning is public statements 
made by administration officials it is unclear how strong their justifications are. The liberal 
definition of imminent that they apply does not have widespread acceptance within the 
international community. Moreover, it is unclear whether the AUMF would cover military action 
in Yemen or ifAQAP is covered under the resolution. If not, the President might be able to rely 
on his Commander in Chief powers alone. 45 However, these justifications fail to sufficiently 
address the deprivation of the due process rights involved in the targeting of American citizens. 
Most troubling is Attorney General Holder's conclusion that citizens are entitled to "due process, 
not judicial process." Given the most recent Supreme Court cases concerning terrorism this 
assumption is not especially strong. 
II. Emergency Powers and Combatting Terrorism - The United States, United 
Kingdom, and the State of Israel 
42 Id. 
43 !d. 
44 !d. 
A. The United States 
1. The Civil War and Habeas Corpus 
45 See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Failure 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673, 1673-74, (1999-
2000) (In 1998, President Clinton used cruise missiles to target suspected terrorists in Sudan and Afghanistan 
without Congressional approval.). 
0 
The United States Constitution is relatively ambiguous in its delegation of emergency 
powers. The sole reference to the authority to take action during an emergency can be found in 
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, also known as the Suspension Clause: "The privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the 
public safety may require it."46 The power to suspend the writ is clearly delegated to Congress, 
being found in Article I, and by the text of the Clause the only explicit cases of emergency where 
the writ can be suspended are in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution does not express 
what other circumstances, beyond rebellion or invasion, may be defined as an emergency nor 
does it specify who, or what, determines the extent or duration of an emergency. 
The writ has only been suspended four times in American history: during the Civil War; 
during Reconstruction; following the Spanish-American War in the Philippines; and in Hawaii 
following the attack on Pearl Harbor.47 Of the occasions where the writ has been suspended, the 
former three fall squarely within the rebellion framework while the latter would qualify as an 
invasion. In this respect all four would qualify as emergencies anticipated by the Framers. 
The most controversial of the suspensions of the writ would certainly be Lincoln's 
suspension of the writ during the Civil War. By its placement in Article 1, the authority to 
suspend is clearly granted to the Legislative branch. However, at the onset of the Civil War 
President Lincoln did so in the military distract that encompassed Washington D.C. without prior 
legislative authorization.48 It can hardly be argued that the circumstances Lincoln faced did not 
amount to a rebellion. Insurrection in Maryland had threatened to isolate the Capital from the rest 
of the Union and Lincoln authorized his military commanders to suspend habeas corpus if 
.,; 
.. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2. 
41 Jonathan Shaw, The War and the Writ: Habeas Corpus and security in an age of terrorism, HARvARD MAGAZINE 
(Jan.-Feb. 2009), available at http:/lharvardmagazine.com/2009/01/the-war-the-wtit?page=all. 
•• Id. 
1ll 
necessary.49 When the writ was suspended not only was the stage set for the first Constitutional 
battle over the Suspension Clause, but also the President faced the first significant challenge to 
his power during an emergency in American history. 
In Ex Parte Merryman, 5° Chief Justice Roger Taney, acting in his capacity as a circuit court 
judge for the District of Maryland, was asked to determine whether Lincoln had the authority 
suspend the writ. In a scathing rebuke to the President's actions, Chief Justice Taney opinion 
stated that: 
These great and fundamental laws, which congress itself could not 
suspend, have been disregarded and suspended, like the writ of 
habeas corpus, by a military order, supported by force of arms. 
Such is the case now before me, and I can only say that if the 
authority which the constitution has confided to the judiciary 
department and judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or 
under any circumstances, be usurped by the military power, at its 
discretion, the people of the United States are no longer living 
under a government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty 
and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose 
military district he may happen to be found. 51 
Despite the clear ruling that his actions had been deemed unconstitutional, the president 
disregarded the order and opined: "Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"52 President Licoln would go on to 
suspend the writ a number of times during the Civil War, with the battle between the Judiciary 
and the Executive becoming moot with the passage of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act in 
March 1863Y 
., Id. 
50 17 F. Cas 144 (C.C.D. Md 1861). 
51 ld. at 152. 
52 JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT'S WAR 
POWERS, at 197 (2006). 
53 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, Chap. LXXXI, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). 
1 1 
2. World War II, Korematsu, and Youngstown Steel 
The era of the Second World War represented a dramatic shift in the willingness of the 
Court to approve of Executive action during wartime. Supreme Court decisions in Ex parte 
Quirin54 and Johnson v. Eisentrager55 offered a significantly more expansive view of Executive 
powers during wartime than its Civil War predecessors. However, whereas the decisions in 
Quirin and Eisentrager dealt with non-citizens who had taken up arms against the United States, 
the Court's decision in Korematsu came to represent the approval of the Executive exercise of 
power over American citizens during times of war. 
The Korematsu case dealt with the Executive's authority to issue an order providing for 
the internment of Japanese Americans on the west coast of the United States during the war. 56 
Korematsu challenged his detention as a violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the equal protection challenge the Court's decision rested not 
on the constitutional validity of the racial classification but on the authority of the President 
during war: 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of 
hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war 
with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted 
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt 
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided 
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens 
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast 
temporarily, and, fmally, because Congress, reposing its 
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders - as 
inevitably it must - determined that they should have the power 
to do just this. 57 
54 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (holding that the President bas the authority to try "unlawful combatants" by military 
tribunal and declining habeas review). 
55 339 U.S. 763, 790-91 (holding that U.S. conrts had no jurisdiction over German prisoners being held in a U.S. 
administered prison in Germany). 
56 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
57 !d. at 223; See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
,,., 
While Korematsu has historically been excoriated due to its racist underpinnings, it was the 
embrace of the idea that the Executive has significantly greater powers to limit certain 
fundamental rights of citizenship during times of war which had a lasting effect 
Because Congress had acquiesed in the President's decision to detain Japanese 
Americans in internment camps in Korematsu, the Supreme Court had no occasion to question 
the President's authority to act contrary to Congressional wishes. This determination would 
come before the Court during the Korean War in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 58 In 
an attempt to prevent a nationwide strike, which he beleved would jeopardize national security, 
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the country's steel 
mills. The Court eventually held that the President did not have the inherent authority to seize the 
mills and in doing so had acted contrary to Congressional intent. 59 The decision in Youngstown 
represented only a mild departure from the Supreme Court's deference to Executive decisions 
during wartime. However, this departure from unlimited Executive powers during times of war 
would have significant implications nearly half a century later. 
3. The Global War on Terror 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration 
implemented a program of indefinite detention of both American citizens and non-citizens 
suspected of terrorism.60 The majority of these 'detainees" were held at the American military 
prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This was a concerted attempt by the administration to 
58 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
59 Id. at 588-89. 
60 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012) (In 2002, the Bush Administration made a sweeping declaration that the 
majority of the detainees were "unlawful combatants" and thus were not protected by the Geneva Convention. A 
special detention facility was set up at the American Naval Base in Guantanamo, the reasoning being that the 
Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager would withdraw them from the reach of the judiciary. In addition 
to those detained at Guantanamo, a smaller group of "high value" detainees were held in secret prisons scattered 
around the globe by the Central Intelligence Agency). 
1~ 
withdraw federal habeas jurisdiction to review Executive detention from the courts.61 However, 
from 2004-2008, in a series of narrow, technical decisions, concerning both Executive and 
legislative attempts to withdraw habeas jurisdiction, the Supreme Court rejected the 
administration's "unitary Executive" theory and the broad presidential powers commensurate 
with it. 
Beginning with Rasul v. Bush, 62 the Supreme Court took a number of steps to 
significantly limit the Executive's authority to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely and beyond 
the reach of judicial review. In Rasul, the Government, basing their contentions on Eisentrager, 
argued that the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions of aliens being detained 
abroad. 63 In fact, the choice of Guantanamo was an explicit attempt to place the detainees 
beyond the reach of the judiciary.64 However, the Supreme Court held that although the United 
States lacked ultimate seovereignty that they did exercise "exclusive jurisdiction and control".65 
Based on this determination the Court rejected the Adminstration's reasoning and found that the 
judiciary had jurisdiction to hear habeas reviews of those detained at Guantanamo. 66 
In response to the Court's ruling in Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 (DTA).67 The bulk of the Act seeked to remedy many of the abuses which had taken 
place at Guantanamo since its inception as a prison for detainees. However, in response to the 
Court's decision regarding the process due those individulas held at Guantanamo, tbe DTA also 
61 See Brief for the Respondents at 14-50, Rasnl v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03,343). 
62 542 u.s. 446 (2004). 
63 Brief For the Respondents, supra note 51, at 14-50. 
64 See Cullen Murphy, Todd S. Purdum, David Rose, Philippe Sands, Guantanamo: An Oral History, VANITY FAIR 
(January 11, 2012), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/0l/guantanamo-bay-oral-history-201201 
("The whole point of Guantanamo was to create a regime of incarceration and interrogation- including torture-
that the law conld not reach: a "legal black hole," as the English court of appeal put it. Although the 45-square-mile 
naval base on the southern shore of Cnba is fully subject to the U.S. writ ... the Bush Administration argued from the 
outset that Guantanamo was outside American legal jurisdiction, and that, in essence, its personnel could treat 
detainees as they wished."). 
65 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 467. 
66 I d. at 485. 
67 Detainee Treatment Act of2005, 42 U.S.C.A §2000dd (West). 
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established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) to determine the status of those being 
detained. 68 While the Act did provide for appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia, it nonetheless stripped the judiciary of original jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions. 
Not surprisingly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld/9 the Court rejected this attempt, through the 
DT A, to withdraw detainees from the reach of the courts and found that the president lacked the 
authority to establish the tribunals. Furthermore, it found that the military commissions 
established by the Bush admiuistration shortly after the September 11th attacks violated both the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Third Geneva Convention.7° Following the 
Court's decision in Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of2006 (MCA).71 
The main purpose of the MCA was to establish the procedures for trying detainees by military 
commissions valid under the UCMJ and Geneva Conventions.72 However, it also attempted to 
strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of those being detained not only at 
Guantanamo but also eliminated habeas jurisdiction for any alien, wherever seized or held, so 
long as they have been, "determined by the Uuited States to have been properly detained as an 
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination."73 
68 Id. at§ 1405 (The section of the Act establishing the CSRTs explicitly attempted to remove habeas jurisdiction 
from the judiciary: "Except as provided in section I 005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or 
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of 
an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). 
69 548 U.S. 557, 575-76 (2006)(The Court took the preliminary step of finding that the DTA and CSRTs did not 
strip the judiciary of the power to hear habeas petitions and that abstention was not necessary in the present case). 
70 I d. at 590-635 (In a lengthy opinion, the Court first found that the military commissions set up by the Bush 
Administration were not authorized by either the DTA, AUMF, or the UCMJ. It then proceeded to find that the 
military commissions themselves violated the UCMJ and the Geneva Convention). 
71 Military Commissions Act of2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006). 
72 I d. § 948b ("PURPOSE. -This chapter establishes procedures governing the use of military commissions to try 
alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and 
other offenses triable by military commission."). 
73 Id. § 950j ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any other provision oflaw ... no 
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action whatsoever, including 
any action pending on or filed after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, relating to 
the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission under this chapter, including challenges to the 
lawfulness of procedures of military commissions under this chapter."). 
In 2008, Boumediene challenged the constitutionality of the statute. 74 In a five-member 
majority ruling the Court, for the third time, struck down an attempt to withdraw habeas review 
from the judiciary. Specifically, the Court found that the CSRTs did not provide a sufficient 
alternative to habeas proceedings, that Congress's jurisdiction-stripping effort violated the 
Suspension Clause and that absent a wholesale suspension of the writ neither the President nor 
Congress could carve out an exception as it pertained to individuals detained at Guantanamo 
Whereas Rasul, Hamdan and Boumediene dealt with the access to habeas review 
concerning non-citizens, the Supreme Court has also had occasion to consider the procedural 
rights due an American citizen designated an "enemy combatant" by the Executive. In Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld/6 a plurality of the Court agreed with the Executive on the substantive issue of whether 
it could lawfully detain enemy combatants without preferring criminal charges. However, the 
Court went on to find that, procedurally, the decision to detain Hamdi indefinitely was 
deficient.77 Applying the procedural due process test promulgated in Mathews v. Eldridge,78 the 
Court determined that Hamdi was entitled to, "notice of the factual basis for his classification, 
74 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
75 !d. at 792 ("Although we do not hold that an adequate substitute must duplicate §2241 in all respects, it suffices 
that the Govermnent has not established that the detainees access to the statutory review provisions at issue is an 
adequate substitute for the writ of habeas corpus. MCA § 7 thus effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ."). 
76 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ("There is no barto this Nation's holding one of its own as au enemy 
combataut .... [I]fthe record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, 
those detentions are part of the exercise of 'necessary and appropriate force,' and therefore are authorized by the 
AUMF."). 
77 !d. at 532. 
78 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976) ("More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that 
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, 
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."). 
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and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker."79 
Taken as a whole, this series of Supreme Court decisions represent a substantial 
weakening of the unlimited emergency powers that the Executive has enjoyed throughout 
American history. It is clear that suspected terrorists, citizen and non-citizen alike, are entitled to 
both the substantive and procedural safeguards of the Constitution. Because of the amorphous 
and seemingly indeterminate nature of the war on terror, this ongoing conflict between the 
Judicial Branch and the Executive and Legislative Branches represents a significant impediment 
to the efficient and effective waging of the war. 
The American approach has traditionally sought to deal with emergencies within the 
general framework of the Constitution, despite its ambiguous language and unclear allocation of 
emergency powers. The result has been that throughout separate eras power has been exercised 
and rights have been affected in an inconsistent manner. A second approach for dealing with 
emergencies relating to terrorism, particularly within the United Kingdom and Israel, has been ad 
hoc legislative mechanisms that address what are determined to be ongoing threats of terrorism. 
The following section addresses whether such a system would be better suited to confront the 
terrorist threat. 
B. Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom 
Many of the emergency laws enacted in the United Kingdom prior to 2001 dealt with the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, as opposed to any threat from international terrorism. The most 
significant of these was the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA).80 Passed 
in response to shootings and bombings committed by both Unionist and Loyalist forces in 
79 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
80 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, (N.Ir.). 
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Northern Ireland, the Act removed the right to trial by jury for a number of serious offenses, 
including murder, bombings and armed robbery.81 The EPA also granted the police broad powers 
to arrest those suspected of being part of a terrorist organization and to perform warrantless 
searches. 82 Furthermore, membership in a proscribed terrorist organization, defined as "the use 
of violence for political ends", became a criminal offense. 83 
As Irish Republican Army (IRA) activity spread to England, Scotland and Wales, 
Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1974.84 Whereas the EPA covered 
only Northern Ireland, the PTA was in effect throughout the United Kingdom. The PTA allowed 
the police to detain persons for up to seven days without judicial approval and the Secretary of 
State to remove individuals from the United Kingdom. 85 Although the PTA was also used 
against international terrorists, the overwhehning majority of those it was used against were 
lrish. 86 For a quarter century the majority of terrorism laws passed in the United Kingdom 
concerned the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland. However, in 2000, Parliament passed the 
Terrorism Act, which provided an extended list of proscribed terrorist organizations, including 
those beyond association with Northern Ireland. 87 
The Terrorism Act was short lived, and in response to the September 11th attacks the 
United Kingdom passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act.88 The matters covered by 
the act include the seizure of terrorist property, new police powers, and the detention of 
81 /d. §2 ("A trial on indictment of a scheduled offense shall be conducted by the court without a jury."); See id. sch. 
27 for list of schedule offenses. 
82 /d. §§10-18. 
83 Id. §19, 28. 
84 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, (U.K.). 
85 Id. §5, 7 
86 See Susan Breau, Stephen Livingstone & Rory O'Connel~ Anti-Terrorism Law and Human Rights in the United 
Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, QUEENS UNIVERSITY BELFAST, p.2 (last visited Dec. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/china-society-pub1ications-911.pdf. 
87 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, (U.K.). 
88 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, (U.K.) (hereinafter ACS Act). 
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suspected international terrorists.89 Specifically, the act reintroduced internment without trial into 
United Kingdom law, allowing the Home Secretary to detain a non-national suspected of being 
an international terrorist so long as he reasonably believes the individual to be a threat to national 
security and to order a person's removal from the country.90 
Under the Act an individual who wished to challenge his detention was unable to do so in 
ordinary courts. The Act provided that the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
was to hear any challenge to an individual's detention and could reverse the Home Secretary's 
decision if it were found there were no reasonable grounds for detention.91 The SIAC does not 
operate under ordinary court rules and the Commission may hear secret evidence against the 
detainee in the absence of the detainee or his legal representative. Although, the Act did allow an 
individual to appeal SIAC decisions to the Court of Appeals.92 
In response to certain provisions of the 2001 Act being invalidated by the House of 
Lords, Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.93 The invalidated provisions 
concerned the detention of non-nationals and were ruled by the Honse of Lords to be a violation 
of both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act of 1998.94 The 
2005 Act established the "control order", a form of house arrest, as a lesser restrictive means of 
monitoring individuals suspected of terrorist ties than those provided for by the 2001 Act. 95 
Despite being a lesser restrictive means of protecting the public from a terrorist act, the "control 
orders" are significantly constrictive of the individual's liberty rights, including limits on the 
89 !d.§§ 1,23,89-101 
90 Id. §§ 21-36 
91 Id. 
92 !d. 
93 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, (U.K.) [hereinafter PTA]. 
94 See A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2002] EWCA Civ 
1502 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-l.htm (For more on this case see Part 
III). 
95 PTA, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1-9. 
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person's employment, associations or communications with certain individuals, freedom of 
movemt;llt and electronic tagging.96 
.r 
The powers granted under the 2005 Act were quickly supplemented following the July 
2005 bombings of the London Subway when Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2006.97 In 
addition to modifying existing offences, the Act introduces new offenses such as encouragement 
of terrorism or dissemination of terrorist publications.98 The Act also extended the period of 
detention for those suspected ofterrorism.99 During debate in the House of Commons, a ninety-
day detention period before being charged was proposed, representing a significant extension of 
the fourteen days that were currently allowed under existing legislation. However, the 
amendment was defeated and the period of detention was only extended to twenty-eight days, 
double what was previously allowed.100 
As shown above, the United Kingdom has a robust statutory framework for preventative 
detention in addition to a broad definition of what constitutes terrorism and the criminal 
sanctions attached to their violation. Because the European Convention on Human Rights binds 
the United Kingdom there has been a more concerted effort by the United Kingdom to deal with 
the threat of terrorism within a criminal justice framework. 101 Despite efforts to bring individuals 
to trial where possible, there is still a large margin of discretion granted to Parliament regarding 
legislative acts that implicate fundamental rights. The post-2000 Acts significantly increased 
police powers when combatting terrorism, and, moreover, the procedures applied to detention 
hearings lack the protections commensurate with a traditional criminal proceeding. While 
96 ld. 
97 Terrorism Act, 2006, c. II, (U.K.). 
98 ld. § 1. 
99 I d.§ 23. 
100 Matthew Tempest, Blair defeated on terror bill, THE GUARDIAN (November 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/nov/09/uksecurity.terrorism. 
101 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.) ("An act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under 
the European Convention on Human Rights."). 
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judicial bodies have provided a legitimate check on legislative overreaching, there are still 
important fundamental rights that are restricted by the struggle between liberty and security in 
the United Kingdom. 
C. Emergency Powers in Israel 
Focus on the state of Israel is especially relevant concerning the war on terrorism. Israel 
has been in a constant state of emergency since it's founding and, as such, has a large body of 
law concerning explicit emergency powers. Because the nature of the war on terrorism appears 
increasingly indefinite the lessons learned from the Israeli experience can provide a case study 
for whether or not explicit emergency provisions are wise and the considerable chance that they 
may be used to violate human rights both in the international and domestic spheres. 
The authority to determine when an emergency exists in Israel is provided by the Basic 
Law: The Government. 102 That authority is explicitly granted to the Knesset, the Israeli 
legislative body. 103 Despite the Basic Law stating that a declared emergency may not exceed one 
year, it provides that the Knesset as necessary may renew the emergency. 104 Therefore, the 
Knesset has consistently renewed the state of emergency since 1948. The Basic law also 
provides that should the Prime Minister determine it is impossible to convene the Knesset, he 
ak I . . . ak th 105 may m e emergency regu atlons or empower a Illlllister to m e em. 
Israel's emergency laws are divided into three main categories: Defence (Emergency) 
Regulations, administrative orders, and formal emergency Laws. The first of these, Defence 
102 Basic Law: The Government, 2001, § 38, SHNo. 1780 (Isr.). 
103 I d. §38(a) ("Should the Knesset ascertain that the State is in a state of emergency, it may, of its own initiative or, 
ftursuant to a Government proposal, declare that a state of emergency exists."). 
04 I d. §38(b) ("the Knesset may make a renewed declaration of a state of emergency as stated."). 
105 I d. §39(b ). 
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(Emergency) Regulations, are a holdover from the British Mandate of Palestine. 106 The original 
aim of these laws was to suppress Palestinian and Jewish insurgency during the period from 
193 7-1945. 107 Despite being the law of a colonial power, the Modem State oflsrael incorporated 
the Defence (Emergency) Regulations into their own law due to the state's establishment during 
a time of war.108 As a result, the power to enforce the Defence (Emergency) Regulations belongs 
to military authorities. These include the power to arrest, inspections, and the ability to open and 
close roads and businesses.109 The regulations also allow for the military to suppress movement 
and speech. 110 
Despite being termed emergency laws, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations are not 
dependent on a declared state of emergency, nor are they restricted to any time limit. 111 
Furthermore, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations grant vast power to the military authorities. 
In addition to the powers that can have a significant affect on the daily lives of Israelis and 
Palestinians, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations have also been used to expropriate Arab 
lands and to try civilians by military tribunal.112 Despite multiple attempts to repeal the Defence 
-----fl',IIWFgency) Regulations legislation has repeatedly stalled in the Knesset. 113 However, the 
Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, passed by the Knesset in 1979, did manage to repeal the 
provisions of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations concerning administrative detention. 114 
106 Yoav Mehozay, The Fluid Jurisprudence of Israel's Emergency Pawers: Legal Patchwork as a Governing Norm, 
42 LAW & SOC'YREV 137 (2012) (The original declaration was made on May 21, 1948). 
107 Id. at 143. 
108 Id. at 144; The day following the Declaration of the Independence oflsrael, forces from Egypt, Transjordan, 
Syria, and Iraq invaded the former Mandate of Palestine cuhninating in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. 
109 Id. at 143; See also B'Tselem, Defense (Emergency) Regulations (April29, 2010), 
http://www .btselem.orglprintpd£122543. 
110 Mehozay, supra note 42, at 143. 
111 Id. 
112 B'Tselem, supra note 98. 
113 !d. (Efforts to repeal the regulations in 1951 and 1967 failed. The effort in 1967 stalled after the outbreak of the 
1967 War. Since that time no serious effurt bas been undertaken to repeal the regulations). 
114 B'Tselem, The legal basis for administrative detention in Israel and the Occupied Territories (July 22, 20 12), 
available at http://www.btselem.org/administrative _detention/israeli _law. 
Administrative emergency orders are the second form of Israeli emergency laws and are 
considered original Israeli law, in that they were not inherited from the colonial power. 115 
Generally, administrative emergency orders delegate legislative authority to government 
ministers. These orders differentiate from the Defence (Emergency) Regulations in only a few, 
but significant, respects. First, administrative emergency orders are dependent on a declared state 
of emergency. Second, emergency orders must be in accordance with "the defense of the State, 
public security and the maintenance of supplies and essential services." 116 However, such 
language poses no significant constraint on the authority of the Knesset to pass such orders, 
given that the objectives are so broad. These types of orders have commonly been used as part of 
a broad administrative detention regime in both the West Bank and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. 117 
Administrative detention in the West Bank is currently carried out under an 
administrative order.li8 The Order grants military commanders in the West Bank the power 
detain a person for up to six months, so long as they have reasonable grounds to believe that "a 
certain person must be held in detention for reasons to do with regional security or public 
security" .119 The military commanders, at their own discretion, may extend the detention order 
for an additional period of up to six months.120 However, the order fails to specify a maximum 
period in which an individual can be administratively detained. 
115 Mehozay, supra note 42, at 146. 
116 See Basic Law: The Government, 2001, § 39(a), S.H. 1780 p.l58 (lsr.). 
117 B'Tselem, Criticism of administrative detention under the Administrative Detention Order (Jan. I, 2011) 
available at http://www.btselem.org/administrative _detention/criticism _on_ the_ administrative_ detention_ order; See 
also B'Tselem, Statistics on Administrative Detention (Nov. 12, 2012) available at 
http://www.btselem.org/administrative _detention/statistics. 
118 B'Tselem, supra note 103; See also Order regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and 
Samaria), 5770-2009, SH No. 1651 p. 271 (Isr.). 
119 Order regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2009, SH No. 1651 § 
273(a) (lsr.). 
120 !d. § 273(b). 
Whereas the Defence (Emergency) Regulations were silent on the issue of judicial 
review, the administrative detention order provides that individuals who are detained are entitled 
to challenge their detention. 121 According to the order, within eight days from the day the person 
is detained, the individual must be brought before a military judge to determine if the detention is 
justified. 122 The military judge may approve the order, cancel it, or shorten the duration. 123 
Deviation from the criminal rules of evidence are allowed during hearings and either the detainee 
or the military commander may also appeal the military court's decision to the Military Court of 
Appeals. 124 
Despite the comprehensive and broad authority encompassed by the Defence 
(Emergency) Regulations and administrative emergency orders, there is still a third category of 
Israeli emergency laws. The Knesset formally enacts this class of laws in their capacity as the 
legislative authority in Israel. 125 Many formal emergency laws begin as administrative 
emergency orders, limited to three-month periods and intended to be temporary. 126 However, 
when renewed by the Knesset they become formal laws, part of the Israeli statutory 
framework. 127 
Formal emergency laws provide the Israeli government with an additional tool for 
detaimnent of suspected terrorists. The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law was enacted, in 
1979, to replace the provisions regarding administrative detention in the Defence (Emergency) 
Regulations. 128 In contrast to the administrative detention order, the Emergency Powers 
(Detention) Law applies to residents of Israel, resident of the occupied territories, and foreign 
121 Id. § 275(a)-(b). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. § 277(a)-(c), 278(a)-(b). 
125 Mehozay, supra note 95, at 152. 
126 Id. at 153. 
121 Id. 
128 Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739-1979, SH No. 76 (Isr.) [hereinafter EPDL]. 
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nationals.129 Despite the broader application of these laws, the detainee is entitled to review of 
their confmement before the President of the District Court where they are detained. 130 The 
review must take place within three months of the detainment and the President may set aside the 
detention order if he believes it was not made for reasons of state security or public security or if 
it was made in bad faith or for irrelevant considerations.131 
In response to the first and second intifadas, the Knesset passed another set of formal 
laws, further convoluting the legal framework governing detention. Entitled the Internment of 
Unlawful Combatants Law, the purpose of this law is to regulate the detainment of civilians who 
carry out hostilities against Israel and are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status under 
international humanitarian law.132 The Law enables the detention of individuals for an unlimited 
period of time if the chief of staff, or an officer holding the rank of major-general or above, 
believes that their release will harm state security. 133 
Similar to the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, the Unlawful Combatants Law 
stipulates that judicial review is to be held before a District Court judge once every six 
months.134 However, it differs in a significant respect. The Law provides that during the judicial 
proceedings the state can rely on two legal presumptions: 1) release of the detainee will harm 
state security, and 2) the determination of the Minister of Defense that the organization the 
detainee is a part of is perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel. 135 
129 B'Tselem, supra note 103. 
130 EPDL,supranote 117, §4(a)-(d). 
131 /d. §4(c). 
132 Internment of Unlawful Combatants, 2002, 5762-2002, SH No. 192, § I (lsr.) ("This Law is intended to regulate 
the incarceration of unlawful combatants not entitled to prisoner-of-war statns, in a manner conforming with the 
obligations of the State of Israel under the provisions of international hnmanitarian law."). 
133 ld. § 3(a). 
134 Id. § 5(a)-(t). 
135 Id. §7. 
As shown above, the Israeli system for handling emergencies is extremely convoluted. 
There is a large amount of overlap between the Regulations, Administrative Orders, and Laws. 
Furthermore, there is both an official and unofficial hierarchy between the laws. While some 
require a declared state of emergency, others are in operation at all times. It is also unclear which 
law may have supremacy given a conflict between relevant provisions. However, the more 
disconcerting development has been the asymmetrical manner in which the law has been applied. 
The Defence (Emergency) Regulations have frequently been used to expropriate Palestinian 
lands in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 136 Moreover, administrative detention has been 
used extensively and disproportionately against Palestinians.137 The result has been that, rather 
than a set of laws applicable only to emergency situations, the emergency regime has become a 
governing tool.138 
In 2008, the Israeli Supreme Court had the occasion to address the constitutionality of the 
Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.139 The case dealt with two residents of the Gaza Strip 
who were being held by Israel as alleged members ofHezbollah and, as the individuals claimed, 
in violation of their right under the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.140 In ruling that the 
Law was constitutional the Court applied section eight of the statute: "There shall be no violation 
of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted 
136 B'Tselem, supra note 98. 
137 B'Tselem, supra note 106. 
138 See Mehozay, supra note 95, at 137 {"Israel's long-standing state of emergency has had considerable bearing on 
tbe state's governance. Less known, but equally important, is tbe fact tbat Israel's legal system featnres several 
overlapping and incoherent emergency legal mechanisms tbat exist side by side. lbis article demonstrates tbat 
Israel's ever-shifting body of emergency law has been used to suit its governing authorities' political ends. A chief 
goal has been to create flexibility in the application oflaw in order to systematically discriminate against 
Palestinians while maintaining a degree oflegitimacy as a government by law."). 
139 CrimA 6659/06 A and B v. State oflsrael [2008] {lsr.) (For further discussion of this case refer to Part III). 
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"' Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, SH No. 1391 {lsr.). 
for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required."141 This test is known as the 
principle of proportionality. 
III. Due Process Balancing v. the Principle of Proportionality 
A. The Need for a Legal Framework Regarding Targeted Killings 
During the war on terror, each attempt by the Executive to withdraw habeas review from 
the courts has resulted in a strong rebuke from the Supreme Court. Given that the war on terror 
appears to be indefinite in duration, the United States must clearly address what powers the 
President has to limit constitutional rights while combatting terrorism rather than continuing to 
address the matter with multiple legislative acts followed by judicial determinations that the 
President has exceeded his authority. Because the Supreme Court is unlikely to be able to uphold 
the targeted killing program under due process analysis it may be better suited by applying the 
principle of proportionality to American terrorism cases moving forward. 
As part of his opinion dismiss the al-Aulaqi case, the district court judge cited the political 
question doctrine, implying that the decision to place Mr. al-Aulaqi on a targeted kill list 
constituted a nonjusticiable political question. 142 In doing so, the judge expressed an 
unwillingness to question the Executive's decision to take military action in addition to a 
reluctance to involve the courts in foreign policy-making.143 However, the issue before the court 
was not whether it would be prudent to question the military and foreign policy decision of the 
Executive branch but whether the Executive branch has the authority to unilaterally deprive a 
141 /d. § 8. 
142 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d I, 44-52 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
143 Id. at 52 ("Judges, deficient in military knowledge ... and sitting thousands of miles away from the field of action, 
cannot reasonably or appropriately determine" if a specific military operation is necessary or wise. Whether the 
alleged "terrorist activities" of an individual so threaten the national security of the United States as to warrant that 
military action be taken against that individual is a ''political judgment[ ] ... [which] belong[ s] in the domain of 
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."). 
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U.S. citizen of his life absent due process.144 As stated by the President of the Israeli Supreme 
Court, Aharon Barak: "Judicial review does not examine the wisdom of the decision to engage in 
military activity. In exercising judicial review, we examine the legality of the military 
activity."145 
The decisions regarding the Guantanamo detainees were fraught with political implications. 
Despite this fact, the Supreme Court found judicially manageable standards by which to 
adjudicate the plaintiff's claims. This reflects the Court's determination that: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to 
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.146 
In dismissing the complaint, albeit on standing grounds, the district court left al-Aulaqi's 
constitutional rights wholly un-vindicated.147 Assuming the question eventually comes before the 
Supreme Court, the issue of whether or not the Executive can unilaterally deprive a citizen of 
their procedural and substantive rights absent process will have to be addressed. This would 
involve both the Matthews v. Eldridge 148 test for procedural due process and strict scrutiny 
review regarding the fundamental right to life. Given the courts previous decision in terrorism 
cases, it is difficult to foresee the Executive program surviving this type of review. 
144 Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2 AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp.2d I (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(No. 1:10-cv-01469) ("This case concerns the Executive's asserted authority to carry out "targeted killings" ofU.S. 
citizens suspected of terrorism far from any field of armed conflict. According to numerous published reports, the 
government maintains lists of suspects - "kill lists" - against whom lethal force can be used without charge, trial, or 
conviction. Individuals, including U.S. citizens, are added to the lists based on Executive detenninations that secret 
criteria have been satisfied. Executive officials are thus invested with sweeping authority to impose extrajudicial 
death sentences in violation of the Constitution and international law.). 
145 HCJ 4764/04 Physicians For Human Rights v. The Commander ofiDF Forces in the Gaza Strip, 1!9 [2004]. 
146 W. Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
147 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 14-35. 
148 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); See note 68. 
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B. The Principle of Proportionality 
Whereas the Supreme Court has consistently rejected acts of Executive unilateralism that 
deprive individuals of their fundamental rights throughout the war on terror, courts in the United 
Kingdom and Israel have, through the principle or proportionality, developed a more flexible 
approach to matters concerning the constitutional implications of the conflict. The principle of 
proportionality is a three-step process of judicial review. The first subtest examines whether 
there is a rational connection between the objective and means used to achieve it. The second 
subtest examines whether the objective could be achieved through less intrusive means. The third 
subtest examines whether the injury caused is in proportion to the benefit achieved. 
I. United Kingdom 
It is important to first distinguish the United Kingdom from the United States and Israel 
with regards to the legal regime under which they are operating. The United Kingdom is a 
signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which has domestic legal 
effect pursuant to the Human Rights Act of 1998.149 As a matter of judicial review this has little 
to no effect. Both the European Court of Human Rights and courts in the United Kingdom apply 
the principal of proportionality concerning fundamental rights. However, the rights guaranteed in 
the ECHR are significantly more specific than those guaranteed by the American Constitution in 
addition to being broader in scope.150 
In McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 151 the European Court of Human Rights 
applied the both the second and third subtests of the principle of proportionality, less intrusive 
149 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.); See also note 91. 
15
° Compare Council of Enrope, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. II and I4 (Nov. 4 1950) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.h1ml, with U.S. CONST. amend. I-X (For instance, the ECHR 
explicitly provides for freedom from government intrusion in an individuals private and family live and right to 
marry whereas in the United States those rights have been granted only through judicial decisions). 
151 Case of McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 324 Eur. H.R. Rep. 424, 545 (1985). 
means and proportionality in the narrow sense, regarding the targeted killing of three Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) agents in Gibraltar. The claim in McCann had been that the 
soldiers, in killing the PIRA agents, had acted in contravention of Article 2 of the ECHR.152 In 
addressing whether Article 2 had been violated the court looked to whether the actions of the 
soldiers where in fact proportionate and to whether the planning and organization of the 
operation made lethal action necessary. 153 
The court applied the customary international law rule of self-defense in determining 
whether the actions of the soldiers met the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. 154 In doing 
so, they found that the decision of the soldiers to take lethal action was proportional to the 
objective achieved: "The Court accepts that the soldiers honestly believed, in the light of the 
information that they had been given, as set out above, that it was necessary to shoot the suspects 
in order to prevent them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss oflife."155 
However, the court went on to find that the control and organization of the operation as a 
whole violated Article 2.156 Because the United Kingdom had previous knowledge of the plan to 
attack and had failed to detain the PIRA agents upon their entry to Gibraltar, the court found that 
lethal action had been rendered inevitable. 157 Despite the Government assertion that if they had 
detained the agents at the border there would not have been sufficient evidence to detain and try 
the individuals, the court was "not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the 
152 !d.~ 145. 
153 !d.~~ 195-214. 
154 !d.~ 192 ("On the one hand, they were required to have regard to their duty to protect the lives of the people in 
Gibraltar including their own military personnel and, on the other, to have minimum resort to the use oflethal force 
against those suspected of posing this threat in the light of the obligations flowing from both domestic and 
international law."). 
155 !d. ~ 200. 
156 !d.~~ 213-214. 
157 !d. 
use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary."158 Therefore, the killings violated 
the second subtest of proportionality. 
The principle of proportionality has also been used to determine the constitutionality of 
the Government's program of detaining suspected terrorists. InA(FC) and Others v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, 159 foreign nationals had been detained under the 200 I Anti-
terrorism, Crime, and Security Act. The foreign nationals had challenged their detainment in 
relation to the first and second subtests for proportionality. While conceding that the prevention 
of a terrorist attack was a sufficiently important o~ective when limiting fundamental rights, they 
challenged whether the legislation was rationally related to the objective and whether there were 
substantially less restrictive measure that could achieve the objective.160 
The House of Lords agreed with the appellants on both these points, thus invalidating 
section 21 and 23 of the Act. 161 These sections allowed for the certification and detention of a 
foreign national, but did not provide similar mechanisms for U.K. nationals. Reasoning that U.K. 
nationals were just as capable of committing terrorist acts as foreign nationals, the House of 
Lords found that the objective of the sections was not rationally related to the prevention of 
terrorism. 162 Moreover, the court pointed to examples of less restrictive measures already 
158 !d. ~204, ~213. 
159 [2004] UKHL 56, [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales), available at 
http://www .publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-l.htm. 
160 ld.1)31(4)-(5) ("(4) Sections 21 and 23 did not rationally address the threat to the security of the United 
Kingdom presented by AI-Qaeda terrorists and their supporters because (a) it did not address the threat presented by 
UK nationals, (b) it permitted foreign nationals suspected of being AI-Qaeda terrorists or their supporters to pursue 
their activities abroad ifthere was any country to which they were able to go, and (c) the sections permitted the 
certification and detention of persons who were not suspected of presenting any threat to the security of the United 
Kingdom as AI-Qaeda terrorists or supporters.; (5) If the threat presented to the security of the United Kingdom by 
UK nationals suspected of being AI-Qaeda terrorists or their supporters could be addressed without infringing their 
right to personal liberty, it is not shown why similar measures could not adequately address the threat presented by 
foreign nationals."). 
161 !d.~ 33. 
162 ld. 
~1 
employed against one of the appellants.163 Consequently, the sections also failed to impair the 
individual's freedom no more than necessary to accomplish the objective. 164 
2. Israel 
The Israeli Supreme Court has applied the principle of proportionality test to a wide array 
of cases, including those dealing with the fence separating Israel proper from the occupied 
territories, the internment of individuals suspected of being a member of a terrorist organization 
and targeted killings. Because of the circumstances Israel finds itself in, the judiciary allows for a 
"margin of constitutional appreciation" concerning legislative acts that implicate fundamental 
rights. 165 Although this margin of appreciation gives the Knesset significant discretion when the 
choice is between fundamental rights and security, it is not a presumption that the legislative act 
in question is constitutional. The Court's decisions reflect this understanding that the test of 
proportionality is a flexible test, involving assessment and evaluation and dependent on the 
circumstances of each case. 
In Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel, 166 the High Court of Justice 
determined whether the military's assessment of the ideal route for a separation fence in the 
occupied territories violated the right of property and freedom of movement of those affected. 
The military had claimed that the location of the proposed separation fence was necessary for 
them to effectively prevent attacks originating in the Palestinian territory. 167 Meanwhile, the 
163 !d.~ 35. 
164 Id. 
165 CrimA 6659/06 A and B v. State oflsrael [2008] ("The subtests sometimes overlap and each of them allow the 
legislature a margin of discretion. There may be circumstances in which the choice of an alternative measure that 
violates the constitutional right slightly less results in a significant reduction in the realization of the purpose or the 
benefit derived from it, and therefore it would not be right to oblige the legislature to adopt the aforesaid measure. 
Consequently this court has recognized a 'margin of constitutional appreciation."). 
166 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government oflsrael [2004]. 
167 !d. ~55 ("He claims that IDF forces' control of Jebel Muktam is a matter of decisive military importance."). 
parties were in disagreement regarding the impact the fence would have on the livelihood of the 
Palestinians affected, although it was admittedly significant. 168 
The Court quickly dispensed with the first two elements of the proportionality test, 
finding that there was a rational connection between the objective of the fence and the proposed 
route and that there was no alternate route that would fulfill security needs while causing lesser 
injury. 169 The decisive factor for the Court was whether the injury to the local inhabitants was 
proportionate to the benefit of the security fence.170 In holding that it was not, the Court found 
that the difference between the proposed route and an alternate route that was less harmful to the 
inhabitants was minimal. 171 Measured against the significant injury perpetrated against the 
inhabitants affected, the result was disproportionate. 172 
Whereas the individuals whose fundamental rights were affected in Beit Sourik were 
farmers and other victims of the ongoing conflict in Israel, the appellants in A and B v. State of 
/srae/ 173 did not necessarily have clean hands. Appellants had been detained under the 
Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law as alleged members of the Hezbollah group. 174 They 
challenged their detention under both international humanitarian law and the Israeli Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty. 175 After focusing on the issue of the detainee's designation as 
uulaw:ful combatants, the Court then addressed their constitutional rights. 
168 Id.1[ 52-53. 
169 Id. 1f 57-58 ("By our very ruling that the route of the fence passes the test of military rationality, we have also 
held that it realizes the military objective of the separation fence .... In this state of affairs, our conclusion is that the 
second subtest of proportionality, regarding the issue before us, is satisfied."). 
170 Id1f 59. 
I7I Jd.1[61 ("The gap between the security provided by the military commander's approach and the security 
provided by the alternate route is minute."). 
172 Id. ("These injuries are not proportionate."). 
173 CrimA 6659/06 A and B v. State oflsrael (2008] (Isr.). 
174/d.1[2. 
175 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr. ). 
As in Beit Sourik, the Court quickly found that the frrst subtest of proportionality, a 
rational connection to the objective, had been satisfied. 176 However, the Court engaged in a more 
detailed analysis of the second subtest. Appellants argued that for the realization of the 
legislative purpose of the Law, detention as an unlawful combatant was not necessary or that 
alternatively, they should be given a criminal trial.177 The Court rejected this argument, stating 
that the purpose of the law was not to punish for past acts but rather to prevent future acts that 
threaten the security of the State. 178 Moreover, the Court found that detention under the 
Internment Law, rather than the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, was proper given the 
different purposes served by each law. 179 In addition, the Court also rejected appellants 
argument that the circumstances of their detention were an excessive violation of their liberty 
rights, and thus out of proportion to the benefit achieved by their detainment.180 Therefore, all 
three subtests of proportionality had been satisfied and the Court declared their detainment 
constitutional. 
The Israeli High Court of Justice has also applied the principle of proportionality while 
addressing the issue of targeted killings. In Public Committee Against Torture v. Government, 181 
the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of whether targeted killings, specifically those where 
176 Id. ~ 32 ("Administrative detention constitutes a suitable means of averting the security threat presented by the 
detainee, in that it prevents the 'unlawful combatant' from retorning to the cycle ofbostilities against the State of 
Israel aod thereby serves the purpose of the law. For this reason the first test of proportionality ~ the rational 
connection test~ is satisfied."). 
177 Id. ~ 33. 
178 See id. ("Bringing someone to a criminal trial is intended to punish him for acts that were committed in the past, 
aod depends upon the existence of evidence that cao be brought before a court in order to prove goilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. By contrast, administrative detention was not intended to punish but to prevent activity that is 
rrohibited by law aod that endaogers the security of the state."). 
79 Id. ~ 35 ("Thus we see that even though the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law aod the Internment of 
Unlawful Combatants Law prescribe a power of administrative detention whose purpose is to prevent a threat to 
state security, the specific purposes of the aforesaid laws are different aod therefore the one canoot constitute ao 
alternative measure for achieving the purpose of the other."). 
180 !d.~ 49 (However, a look at the combined totality of the of the arrangements .... the violation of the constitutional 
right is reasonably commensurate with the social benefit that arises from the realization of the legislative purpose."). 
181 HCJ 769/02 Poblic Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government [2006]. 
collateral damage may be a consequence of the attack, satisfY proportionality in the narrow 
sense, the third subtest. In addressing the third subtest the court held that there must be due 
proportion between the advantage and the damaged caused by the targeted killing: 
The test of proportionality stipulates that an attack on innocent 
civilians is not permitted if the collateral damage to them is not 
commensurate with the military advantage (in protecting 
combatants and civilians). In other words, the attack is 
proportionate if the advantage arising from achieving the proper 
military objective is commensurate with the damage caused by it to 
innocent civilians. This is an ethical test. It is based on a balance 
between conflicting values and interests. 182 
Based on this reasoning, the court held that every targeting killing is not prohibited "ab initio", 
that every targeted killing must satisfY proportionality in the narrow sense and that any harm 
done to civilians must be not only be outweighed by the benefit achieved but also limited to the 
greatest extent possible.183 
As is evident from the Israeli Supreme Court's decisions, the test of proportionality 
allows for a significant amount of discretion with regards to legislative and military decisions. 
However, it is not simply a rubber stamp. Given the ongoing threat of terrorism that Israel faces 
the principle of proportionality provides a flexible approach that varies depending on fact-
specific circumstances and the magnitude of the security interests at stake. This allows the Court 
to balance liberty and security interests appropriately, free from the rigorous application of a 
tiered system of review that can all but predetermine the outcome of a given conflict between 
interests. 
182 Id. 1{45. 
183 Jd. 1{64. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that Anwar al-Aulaqi was a threat to American security. He was 
an admitted jihadist and, although the evidence linking him directly to terrorist attacks has not 
been made public, the influence Mr. al-Aulaqi wielded within the English-speaking jihadist 
community is clear. Three of the post-9/11 attacks have cited al-Aulaqi as inspiration. However, 
the contention that citizens such as al-Aulaqi, Mr. Kahn, and Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi are entitled 
to "due process, not judicial process" is troubling. Because of the Obama Administration's 
unwillingness to disclose the procedures for determining how an individual is placed on a "kill 
list", let alone admit such a program exists, there is a legal vacuum concerning targeted killing. 
At the onset of the war on terror the Bush administration attempted to create a legal black 
hole at Guantanamo. At every step their attempts were rebuffed by a Supreme Court intent on 
upholding the Constitution, even during the struggle against terrorism. Still, the Supreme Court 
has not been unreasonable, finding that the process due suspected terrorists need not be on scale 
with the protections provided in the criminal setting. Due to the logistical difficulties in 
physically detaining individuals such as al-Aulaqi it is unlikely that they well find it necessary 
that the Obama Administration entitle these individuals to Article III trials or even military 
commissions.184 Nevertheless, the current reginle is increasingly untenable. 
Most of the legal questions concerning the war on terror weigh liberty interests, generally 
protected as constitutional rights, against security interests that constitute a collective social 
good. The use of a proportionality test is not completely foreign to the Supreme Court as it has 
184 Perhaps there is the possibility that courts similar to those established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) could be created. FISA courts were established to oversee requests for surveillance warrants against 
suspected foreign intelligence agents. Applications for the warrant take place in front of an individual judge and do 
not involve an adversarial proceeding. Furthermore, where the Attorney General reasonable determines that an 
emergency situation exists he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance; See 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1803, 1805(e). 
applied such a test when competing constitutional interests are weighed. 185 The reality may be 
that the conflict between a citizen's constitutional rights and the collective social benefit of being 
free from terrorism is, "not a context in which a court should effectively presume either 
constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality (as in strict scrutiny)." 186 
At issue with the targeted killing of American citizens is the Executive's authority to 
deprive individuals of their substantive and procedural due process rights. These rights represent 
a significant and fundamental constitutional question and it is difficult to foresee the Supreme 
Court being able to uphold the most serious deprivation of rights, life, absent any process 
whatsoever. Because it is unlikely that the Executive program can survive the procedural due 
process test or strict scrutiny review there is a vacuum in the legal framework regarding the 
targeted killings of Americans. Since the issue is so complex, implicating both constitutional and 
international law concerns, a more flexible approach may be necessary. The principle of 
proportionality can provide such an approach. 
185 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689-90 (2008) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing examples where the 
Court has taken snch an approach). 
186 Jd. at 689. 
